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GENERIC FRAUD AND THE UNIFORM 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
Peter A. Alces* 
INTRODUCTION 
Holmes imagined the "bad man,, 1 a creature of legal analysis 
designed to focus the judge's or lawmaker's or even attorney's atten-
tion on the practical ramifications of a particular legal rule. 2 So long 
as Holmes could see how a bad man would perceive the legal land-
scape, Holmes could appraise the formulation of a given proscription 
or set of proscriptions and prescriptions and understand the law's op-
eration. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFf A") is such a 
set of proscriptions and prescriptions. 3 But the bad man to which I 
allude is not necessarily bad, except perhaps from the perspective of 
an all-assets secured creditor.4 It seems the way for large institutional 
secured creditor interests to evaluate the UFT A's provisions is to im-
agine how counsel for an unsecured creditor of the debtor/transferor 
might attack a transfer of a security interest in all or substantially all 
of the debtor's assets. If counsel for the transferees in such transac-
tions can anticipate the arguments of unsecured creditors' attorneys, 
• Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; A.B. 1977, Lafayette Col-
lege; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. The author is writing a treatise tentatively entitled 
Fraudulent Transactions, to be published in 1989 by Warren, Gorham & Lamont, in which 
portions of this article will appear in another form. L. Landis Sexton, J.D. 1988, University of 
Alabama, provided invaluable research and editorial assistance in preparing this article. 
I Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897). 
2 Holmes explains: 
Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? You will find some text 
writers telling you that it is something different from what is decided by the courts 
of Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction 
from principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not 
coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man we 
shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that 
he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in 
fact. I am much of his mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, 
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law. 
ld. at 460-61. 
3 U.F.T.A., 7A U.L.A. 643 (1985). 
4 Commercial finance all-assets lending contemplates a significant extension of credit, re-
payment of which is secured by all or virtually all of the debtor's personal and real property. 
The loan is made against the strength of the debtor's assets and not solely on the basis of his 
general reputation or business performance. See A Ices, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in 
Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 655, 660 n.29 (1983) (citing PLI, 
Commercial Finance, Factoring and Other Asset-Based Lending 11 (1980)). 
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those arguments may be preempted by careful structuring of transac-
tions in order to avoid fraudulent transfer attack. If state legislatures 
believe that particular imaginative arguments of junior creditors 
should not prevail, the legislature can draft or amend the fraudulent 
transfer law in order to assure the results deemed most commercially 
desirable. 
To more concretely and particularly explain the nature of the 
issues considered in this Article, put yourself in the position of coun-
sel for a creditor who discovers that a corporation to which the credi-
tor has advanced trade or unsecured credit is unable to discharge its 
obligation to your unsecured creditor client. It quickly becomes ap-
parent that while your client will be left with a specious claim against 
the debtor, ABC Finance Company ("ABC") will cash out its claim 
against the debtor at roughly one hundred cents on the dollar because 
ABC has a security interest in substantially all of the debtor's assets. 
The ostensible inequity of that result troubles your client, even after 
you explain to him the social and microeconomic attraction of Uni-
form Commercial Code article 9. 5 
The client asks if anything can be done to help him realize some-
thing from the debtor's carcass. Here's where the "bad man" theory 
becomes a useful analytical tool. What would the unsecured credi-
tor's counsel (the bad man) think up in order to attack ABC's security 
interest? Recent developments6 and scholarship' in commercial law 
suggest that courts may gaze fondly upon the creative theories devel-
oped by counsel on behalf of unsecured or otherwise downtrodden 
5 For exhaustive treatments of the microeconomic efficiency of secured. lending, see Jack-
son & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143 {1979); 
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, lO J. 
Legal Stud. I (1981); Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. 
Fin. I (1977); Smith & Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt and Optimal Capital Structure: 
Comment 34 J. Fin. 247 (1979). 
6 Durrett v. Washington Nat'1 Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (invalidating mort-
gage foreclosure sale as fraudulent conveyance because sale realized inadequate proceeds). cr. 
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,209 Cal. Rptr. 551 
(1985) (bank liable to commercial customer for claiming spurious legal defenses to avoid pay-
ing for its prior negligent acts); Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 
582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978) (bank m.ay be liable for negligent exchange of com-
mercial papers). In a similar vein, consider the creative use of fraud and misrepresentation 
theories in what are essentially breach of contract cases to circumvent operation of the Uni-
form Commercial Code ("UCC") Article 2 parol evidence rule, U.C.C. § 2-202 (1986), and 
warranty disclaimer provision, U.C.C. § 2-316 (1986). See Mitcheii-Lockyer, Common Law 
Misrepresentation in Sales Cases-An Argument for Code Dominance, 19 Forum 361 (1984). 
7 See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 505 
(1977); Schechter, The Principal Principle: Controlling Creditors Should Be Held Liable for 
Their Debtors' Obligations, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 875 (1986); American Bar Association, 
Emerging Theories of Lender Liability (H. Chartman ed. 1985). 
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creditors. In the course of reviewing the available theories, you come 
across the UFT A, which has recently become law in your jurisdic-
tion. 8 After perusing the several sections of the new Act, you find 
nothing either expressly in the text or more subtly in the comments 
directly addressing your client's dilemma.9 As best as you can dis-
cern, your client's position deteriorated at the time the debtor granted 
an all-assets security interest to ABC. For purposes of this Article, 
assume that the security interest was granted either (1) as a part of a 
leveraged business acquisition, or (2) to secure debtor's upstream or 
cross-stream guaranty of the indebtedness of a parent or affiliate 
corporation. 
This Article will suggest how enterprising commercial counsel 
might conjure up a construction of the UFT A to make a disappointed 
unsecured creditor whole when an upstream or cross-stream guaranty 
or a leveraged. business acquisition has impaired the unsecured credi-
tor's position. I suggest that generic fraud principles, working in tan-
dem with the UFT A's actual or intentional fraud provisions, provide 
the basis for attacking the grant of a:Q. all-assets security interest in the 
8 Choice of law principles may be apposite in deciding which body of fraudulent transfer 
law will be effective in a particular jurisdiction. Sixteen states have adopted the UFT A: Ar-
kansas, Bill No. 967 (76th Gen. Assembly Reg. Sess. 1987) (copy on file at the Cardozo Law 
Review); California, Cal. Civ. Code§§ 3439-3439.12 (West Supp. 1987); Florida, House Bill 
No. 236 (1987) (copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 65lc-l 
to -10 (1985); Idaho, Idaho Code§§ 55-910 to -922 (Supp. 1987); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 14, §§ 3571-3582 (Supp. 1986); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann.§§ 513.20 to .32 (West 1987) 
(copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); Nevada, Assembly Bill No. 60 (1987) (copy on file 
at the Cardozo Law Review); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 545A:1 to :12 (1987) 
(copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code§§ 13-02.1-01 to-
10 (Supp. 1987); Oklahoma (1986), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, §§ 112-123 (West 1987); Oregon, 
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 95.200 -.310 (Supp. 1987); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws§§ 6-16-1 to -12 
(Supp. 1986); South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 54-SA-1 to -12 (Supp. 1987); Texas, 
House Bill No. 2193 (70th Reg. Sess. 1987) (copy on file at the Cardozo Law Review); West 
Virginia, W.Va. Code§§ 40-1A-1 to -12 (Supp. 1987). Seventeen states and the Virgin Islands 
have in force the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA"), predecessor to the UFfA: 
Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 44-1001 to -1013 (1967 & West Supp. 1986); Delaware, Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1301 -1312 (1975); Maryland, Md. Com. Law Code Ann.§§ 15-201 to-
214 (1983); Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. l09A, §§ 1 - 13 (West 1958); Michigan, 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 566.11 -.23 (West 1967); Montana, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-2-301 
to -325 (1985); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 36-601 to -613 (1984); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 25:2-7 to -19 (West 1940); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 56-10-1 to -13 (1978 & 
Supp. 1986); New York, N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law§§ 270-281 (McKinney 1945); Ohio, Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1336.01 to .12 (Anderson 1979); Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 39, 
§§ 351-363 (Purdon 1954); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-3-301 to -314 (1982); Utah, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16 (1984); Virgin Islands, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 28, §§ 201-12 
(1976); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§§ 19.40.010-.130 (1978); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. 
Ann.§§ 242.01 -.13 (West 1987); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat.§§ 34-14-101 to -113 (1977). 
9 See Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 527, 558-64. 
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guaranty and LBO settings. 10 Trust me; this is not entirely alchemy. 11 
And the point is not so much to provide plaintiff's counsel a theory as 
it is to demonstrate the uncertain scope of fraud principles and to 
suggest means by which the UFTA's drafters could and should have 
confronted secured guaranties and LBO's head-on rather than settling 
for the status quo. 
First, this inquiry will explain more completely the secured guar-
anty and LBO contexts in order to provide an accurate picture of the 
interests implicated and to suggest the policy choices involved. The 
Article will then treat generic fraud law, built, as it is, upon principles 
drawn from the law of misrepresentation and deceit. The means of 
incorporating generic fraud into the intentional fraudulent transfer 
calculus are considered: only then can fraud law's pervasive nature be 
appreciated and a commercially plausible concept of intent be framed. 
I conclude by suggesting how the UFT A might be adjusted either to 
foreclose or expressly sanction the accommodation of the interests 
considered in this Article. 
DISTINGUISHING FRAUDULENT INTENT FROM 
INTENT TO DEFRAUD 
It does not make sense to consider the application of the UFT A 
and generic fraud principles without reference to particular commer-
cial transactions. Before a useful analysis of such an application can 
be understood by those representing commercial transactors, it is nec-
essary to describe the parties to the transaction and the context in 
which their interests become entangled. Therefore, I begin with a de-
scription of potentially fraudulent guaranty transactions and lever-
aged business acquisitions. It is necessary to treat the business setting, 
the scholarly commentary which has considered fraudulent transfer 
issues, and developing case law. 
A. Secured Guaranties as Fraudulent Transfers 
In his classic article, Professor Rosenberg distinguished between 
three types of guaranty transactions:12 downstream guaranties (par-
ent guarantees obligation of subsidiary), cross-stream (sister corpora-
tion guarantees obligation of sister corporation), and upstream 
to U.F.T.A. § 10 expressly sanctions reference to supplementary principles of law, includ-
ing common law fraud and misrepresentation. U.F.T.A. § 10, 7A U.L.A. 666 (1985). 
II But see W. Shakespeare, Hamlet III, act iii, scene 2, lines 229-30. ("Ham: Madam, how 
like you this play? Queen: The (law professor] doth protest too much, methinks."). 
12 Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guarantees and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender 
Beware, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 235 (1976) (discussing the UFCA and pre-1979 bankruptcy Jaw). 
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guaranties (subsidiary guarantees obligation of parent). 13 When a 
parent guarantees a subsidiary's obligation, there is no constructive 
fraudulent transfer problem. As an investor in the subsidiary, the 
parent merely protects and enhances the value of its investment by 
guaranteeing the subsidiary's debt. In return for the obligation in-
curred-the grant of a security interest in assets of the parent-the 
parent derives an equal and direct benefit--enhancement of the value 
of its investment in the subsidiary. 
In the cross-stream and upstream contexts fraudulent transfer 
law may rear its ugly head. When a subsidiary grants an all-assets 
security interest to collateralize a guaranty of its parent's debt, the 
subsidiary is incurring an obligation, i.e., the security interest, without 
a counterbalancing benefit. The secured party has normally made 
loan funds available to the parent, and the subsidiary's financial posi-
tion is not directly enhanced by the parent's receipt of those funds. 
Rosenberg further argues that hypothecation of assets without any 
consideration will be subject to attack as a constructively fraudulent 
transfer if the subsidiary is rendered insolvent as a result of the grant 
of the security interest. 14 In the normal course, any corporation asked 
to secure its guaranty obligation will be rendered insolvent because 
the guaranty obligation constitutes a liability and the asset repre-
sented by the loan proceeds will appear on the parent's financial state-
ment.15 The same conclusion follows from the dynamic of a cross-
stream guaranty. Because one of two affiliated corporations does not 
directly benefit from the other's receipt of loan funds, an affiliate that 
grants an all-assets security interest to secure its guaranty of the affili-
ate's indebtedness is rendered insolvent.16 
It should not shock anyone to hear that the commercial commu-
nity, or at least that portion of it represented by lender's counsel, 
found Rosenberg's analysis flawed. It seems that he had not properly 
factored in the value represented by the guarantor's "valuable" com-
13 See id. at 238-39, 262-65. 
14 Section 5(a) of the UFfA states: 
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a credi-
• tor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred 
if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a rea-
sonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor 
was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer 
or obligation. 
U.F.T.A. § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 657. 
1 s The asset represented by the loan proceeds will be balanced on the parent's financial 
statement by the security interest the parent had to grant to secure repayment. 
16 See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 252-57. 
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mon law contribution17 and subrogation18 rights. If, indeed, the guar-
antor were called upon to perform under the guaranty and the 
creditor/guaranteed party had to look to the guarantor's assets, the 
guarantor would then be subrogated to the rights of the secured credi-
tor against the principal debtor. If there were other guarantors, the 
cross-stream or upstream guarantors could collect their pro-rata share 
of the discharged indebtedness by operation of contribution princi-
ples. William Coquillette explained how Rosenberg erred, 19 after 
describing the desirability of upstream guaranties.20 
Perceived more as a problem of valuation than of legal substance, 
the guaranty-as-fraudulent-transfer debate became a matter which 
could be treated on an ad hoc basis; valuations urged by interested 
parties could determine whether fraudulent transfer law would void 
the security interest granted by the guarantor.21 
Cases in which fraudulent transfer issues were presented in the 
guaranty context did little to advance the analysis posited by com-
mentators. Rosenberg argued that the contingent subrogation and 
contribution rights were actually worth nothing or virtually nothing 
because the guarantor would only be called upon to perform under 
the guaranty after the principal obligor was already or very nearly 
insolvent.22 While the practical wisdom of that observation is not un-
assailable, it does to a considerable extent conform to the realities at-
tending the documentation of a secured guaranty as part of an all-
assets commercial finance transaction. In re 0/lag Construction 
17 See Schwartz v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1977) (right of contribution from 
third party is an asset); Wingert v. Hagerstown Bank, 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1930) (right of 
contribution is an asset); O'Grady v. First Union Nat') Bank, 296 N.C. 2i2, 250 S.E.2d 587 
(1978) (right of contribution may vary with change in contract). ' 
IS See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goodman (In re Ollag Constr.), 578 F.2d 904 
(2d Cir. 1978) (subrogation rights may be valued as assets to determine solvency); First Nat'! 
Bank v. Jefferson Sales & Distribs., 341 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Miss. 1971) (subrogation right 
applied where equity requires), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1972); Sterling Factors Corp. v. 
Freeman, 50 Misc. 2d 715, 271 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (guarantor's rights subrogated to 
creditor's claims to inventory in exchange for creditor's foregoing mortgage foreclosure), aff'd, 
27 A.D.2d 956, 279 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1967). 
19 Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidi-
ary Corporation, 30 Case W. Res. 433, 450-56 (1 qso). 
20 ld. at 435-38 (describing situations where. upstream guaranties might be desirable, as 
when parent/holding company owns several subsidiaries enabling superior financing terms 
than individual subsidiaries could achieve). See also Note, Upstream Financing and Use of the 
Corporate Guaranty, 53 Notre Dame L. Rev. 840 (1978); Note, The Corporate Guaranty 
Revisited: Upstream, Downstream, and Beyond-A Statutory Approach, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 
312 (1979). 
21 Alces, supra note 4, at 681 (suggesting "going-concern" valuation of debtor's assets in 
bankruptcy). 
22 Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 256. 
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Equipment 23 refused to follow Rosenberg's analysis. Judge Kaufman, 
writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded that, at 
least on the facts of 0/lag, the contingent contribution and subroga-
tion rights should be considered as having some value.24 
The problem, of course, is with the time at which the valuation 
should be done for purposes of determining whether the assumption 
of guaranty liability renders the guarantor insolvent. A guaranty is a 
form of insurance; at least that is how lenders perceive it. If the prin-
cipal obligor is unable to repay the creditor, the creditor will proceed 
against either the guarantor, the hypothecated assets of the guarantor, 
the assets of the principal obligor, or all three and any additional 
available sources. It is impossible to fix the value of the contingent 
contribution and subrogation rights at the time the guaranty liability 
is assumed. Indeed, were the lender certain that the guaranty would 
not be enforced there would be no reason (save leverage)25 to insist 
upon it, and were the lender certain that it would be enforced, it is 
exceedingly unlikely that the lender would enter into the transaction 
in the first place. Moreover, the lender knows that uncertainty at the 
outset. But does it matter that the guarantor would know of it also? 
After 6 all, by the time fraudulent transfer litigation is initiated it is 
clear that the guarantor's judgment was not infallible. The object is to 
effect the most equitable distribution to creditors-all of the creditors. 
But it is not enough that the contribution or subrogation rights 
are so discounted as to render the guarantor insolvent. Assumption 
of guaranty liability may only be attacked as a constructive fraudulent 
transfer if the guarantor did not receive "a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for the" guaranty.26 Rosenberg's whole point was 
that in the cross-stream and upstream guaranty contexts, the guaran-
tor really did not receive anything of value, much less reasonably 
equivalent value. 27 
A recent guaranty case took a different view of the value received 
by the guarantor. 28 A doctor who had incorporated himself caused 
the professional corporation to execute a guaranty of his indebtedness 
to lender; the guaranty was secured by the professional corporation's 
23 578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978). 
24 ld. at 908. See also Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. Haight, 97 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1938) 
(claim's value in subrogation against the principal must be counted as an asset); Updike v. 
Oakland Motor Car Co., 53 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir. 1931) (contingent claim based on guaran-
teed customer notes excluded as a liability). 
25 See Alces, supra note 4, at 660. 
26 See U.F.T.A. § S(a), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985). 
27 Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 240-57. 
28 In re Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons, 49 Bankr. 316 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). 
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accounts receivable. The doctor used the loan proceeds for personal 
purposes and the guarantor-corporation did not benefit by any more 
than an $8,000 discharge of tax indebtedness. 
In deciding whether the guaranty obligation could be avoided as 
a fraudulent conveyance under the Bankruptcy Code,29 the court had 
to consider whether the professional corporation had received reason-
ably equivalent value in exchange for the guaranty.30 The bankruptcy 
court noted the general rule that a debtor has not received reasonably 
equivalent value "where it transfers its property in exchange for a 
consideration which passes to a third party."31 However, Judge Glen-
non also recognized an exception to that rule: "where the debtor and 
the third party 'are so related or situated that they share an "identity 
of interests" because what benefits one will, in such case, benefit the 
other to some degree.' "32 
Once again, valuation is the focus. A court must decide whether 
there was sufficient vicarious benefit by considering the value actually 
realized by the guarantor. In the Ear, Nose and Throat Surgeons mat-
ter, the bankruptcy court decided that the professional corporation, 
the doctor/guarantor, received "significantly less than the value" re-
ceived by the principal obligor, the doctor/individuaP3 The court 
decided that as a result of undertaking the guaranty liability, the con-
tingent liability represented by the guaranty effectively made the guar-
antor insolvent. 
Ear, Nose and Throat Surgeons concerned constructive fraud, 
and supports Rosenberg's perception of the economic and legal reality 
surrounding upstream guaranties, though not in the intercorporate 
setting. The case well illustrates the standard fraudulent transfer 
analysis, even though it did not treat the valuation of subrogation and 
contribution rights issues considered in Ol/ag.34 Together, however, 
the two opinions capture the contours of the issue, though the opin-
ions seem to subscribe to inconsistent views of the underlying policy 
issues.35 These policy concerns are reconsidered in the next section of 
29 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
30 II U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B) (i), (ii) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
31 49 Bankr. at 320 (citing In re Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc., 23 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 1982)). 
Jz Id. (quoting In re Royal Crown Bottlers, Inc., 23 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) 
(citing Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1981))); In 
re Winslow Plumbing, Heating & Contracting, 424 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (D. Conn. 1976). 
33 49 Bankr. at 320. 
34 See cases cited supra note 18. 
JS Regarding guaranties and fraudulent transfer Jaw, see First Nat'! Bank v. Jefferson Sales 
& Distribs., 341 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Miss. 1971), atf'd, 460 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431 , 477 P.2d 550 (1970). 
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this Article. But first, consider the equities and policies surrounding 
fraudulent transfer treatment of leveraged business acquisitions. 
An illustration of the garden variety LBO accommodates analy-
sis of the issues. 
The aging management and shareholders (sellers) of a privately 
held company approach a group interested in acquiring the com-
pany. Ambition-rich but relatively cash-poor, the acquisition 
group arranges financing through a bank or commercial finance 
company. The lender advances the loan proceeds against the assets 
(accounts receivable, inventory, equipment, real property) of the 
acquired company. The acquisition group pays for the sellers' in-
terest in cash (and perhaps a promissory note). Sellers transfer 
ownership of the company and its assets to the acquisition group 
subject to the security and perhaps mortgage interest of the lender. 
The individual members of the acquisition group, at the insistence 
of the secured lender, often will execute personal (usually secured) 
guaranties of the acquisition loan. 36 
The problem from the perspective of junior unsecured creditors is that 
the corporate entity to which they had been supplying credit is no 
longer as financially viable as it was before the LBO. The corporation 
whose assets have been leveraged purportedly benefits from the infu-
sion of new management. The issue should be familiar: does the bene-
fit of new management constitute value reasonably equivalent to the 
value of the assets hypothecated to secure repayment of the acquisi-
tion financing? It depends whom you ask. 
In their article questioning the very legitimacy of fraudulent 
transfer law ab initio, Professors Baird and Jackson allow "[e]ven 
under the narrowest view of fraudulent conveyance law, the leveraged 
buyout may be a fraudulent conveyance."37 They go so far as to sug-
gest that the transactions might constitute intentional fraud on junior 
unsecured creditors. 38 But then they dismiss such investigations of 
intent as a "messy inquiry" and move onto the constructive fraudu-
lent transfer issues. I'll come back to that mess in the next section. 
Baird and Jackson conclude that LEOs do not clearly prejudice un-
secured creditors' rights: "[w]ith the buyout may come more stream-
lined and more effective management."39 Moreover, if the 
corporation's creditors who had antipledge covenants in their agree-
3 6 Aices & Dorr, supra note 9, at 560. See also Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bank-
ruptcy, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 73, 80-83 (1985) (very helpful description of typical leveraged business 
acquisition contexts). 
37 Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L. 
Rev. 829, 85 I (1985). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 853. 
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ments with the corporation did not accelerate the corporation's in-
debtedness at the time of the LBO, the transaction was probably in 
the best interests of all junior unsecured creditors (or at least those 
with enough clout to insist upon an antipledge covenant). 
Carlson does not subscribe to the Baird and Jackson analysis,40 
though he does agree with their conclusion.41 Carlson's LBO article 
considers such acquisitions in the bankruptcy context, 42 focusing on 
the "savings provision'' of section 548(c), not its actual or construc-
tive fraudulent conveyance provisions. Because bankruptcy law is 
necessarily federallaw,43 Carlson is able to rely on federal precedent44 
to support his conclusion that an LBO should only be set aside as a 
fraudulent transfer when the creditor who supplied the acquisition fi-
nancing in exchange for an all-assets security interest did so knowing 
that the debtor corporation was insolvent and knowing that bank-
ruptcy proceedings were on the horizon.45 It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that state uniform fraudulent transfer law will follow federal 
precedent; indeed, it is likely that some would question Carlson's 
reading of federal precedent. 46 
It is difficult to read too much into the case law concerning 
LBOs. One of the more infamous cases, striking down an LBO, in-
cludes a truly unsavory cast of characters.47 Arguably, however, 
40 Carlson, supra note 36, at 102-03. 
41 Id. at 102 n.95. 
42 II U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
43 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
44 See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917) (mortgage interest securing outstanding un-
secured loan fraudulent because lender knew of debtor's imminent bankruptcy). 
4 5 Carlson, supra note 36, at 76-77. See also id. at 120-21 ("(T]he LBO lender should have 
a defense against fraudulent conveyance liability whenever the lender believes in good faith 
that it is financing a corporate acquisition with a decent chance of survival."). 
46 To limit the Dean proscription to cases in which the lender knew of the debtor's immi-
nent bankruptcy, Professor Carlson cited Justice Brandeis' dictum: 
The mortgage may be made in the expectation that thereby the debtor will extri-
cate himself from a particular difficulty and be enabled to promote the interest of 
all other creditors by continuing his business. The lender who makes an advance 
for that purpose with full knowledge of the facts may be acting in perfect "good 
faith." 
Carlson, supra note 36, at 88-89 (citing Dean, 242 U.S. at 444). Indeed, it is upon a construc-
tion of that dictum that a gopd deal of Carlson's thesis depends. But the Court's Dean deci-
sion largely defers to the lower court's factual determinations and does not suggest that only 
showing lender knowledge of imminent bankruptcy would support avoiding the transaction as 
intentionally fraudulent. The Court noted that "(i]t is a question of fact in each case what the 
intent was with which the loan was sought and made." 242 U.S. at 444. The Court cited 
several cases to support the conclusion "that a mortgage is a fraudulent conveyance where 
taken as security for a Joan which the lender knows is to be used to prefer favored creditors 
.... " Id. at 445 n.l. 
47 See United States v. Gleneagles lnv. Corp., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (former 
labor union president Jimmy Hoffa provided collateral for loan transaction that looked suspi-
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LBOs might in some circumstances be assailable even if the plaintiff is 
not able to imply organized crime connections. But a recent Califor-
nia federal district court case suggests that plaintiffs seeking to set 
aside LBOs as fraudulent transfers might have a tough row to hoe. In 
Credit Managers Association v. Federal Co. ,48 the court construed Cal-
ifornia's fraudulent conveyance statute as not providing a basis to 
avoid the LBO as constructively fraudulent.49 Reluctant to tackle the 
larger issue--whether the scope of fraudulent conveyance law is 
broad enough to reach LBOs at al150- the court found that on the 
facts presented, the plaintiffs were unable to show that the acquired 
corporation was undercapitalized after the transaction. 51 But the key 
to the opinion is in the court's discussion of the plaintiffs' standing to 
attack the LBO: 
These [plaintiff] creditors made a post-buyout decision to extend 
credit on new terms to a new entity, an entity with a very different 
financial structure than its predecessor. As the creditors plaintiff 
represents did not have any substantial stake in [the acquired cor-
poration] at the time of the buyout, there does not appear to be a 
strong reason to give these creditors the right to attack the buyout 
as harmful to them. It would seem that if leveraged buyouts are to 
be susceptible to attack on fraudulent conveyance grounds, only 
those who were creditors at the time of the transaction should have 
a right to attack the transaction. 52 
That point is well-taken, and further discussion of Credit Managers 
below explores the ramifications of the court's analysis and the coinci-
dental generic fraud principles implicated. 53 
Whether it is appropriate to view corporate guaranties and lever-
aged business acquisitions in terms of constructive fraud issues, it 
seems clear that scholarship and recent case law have adopted that 
ciously like money laundering scheme) aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. 
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987). 
48 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
49 The plaintiff did not allege intentional fraud but urged three alternative legal theories 
which the court acknowledged. Id. at 177. 
so The court chose not to confront the "important conceptual question" of whether fraudu-
lent conveyance law applies to leveraged buyouts at all. Id. at 179 (citing Baird & Jackson, 
supra note 37, at 832-33, 852). 
st 629 F. Supp. at 183. 
S2 ld. at 180. 
53 For other cases concerning leveraged business acquisitions, see Wells Fargo Bank v. 
Desert View Bldg. Supplies (In re Desert View Bldg. Supplies), 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 
1978) (proscribing use of undercapitalized company to trick creditors into inevitable loss and 
provide preferred creditors relatively safe investment), aff'd, 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980); In 
re Process·Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (addressing rights of subsequent 
creditor who refinances an LBO debt), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967). 
754 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:743 
perspective, though perhaps without thoroughly considering the in-
tentional fraud issues. Recent decisions concerning upstream and 
cross-stream guaranties respond, albeit sub silencio, to Rosenberg's 
constructive fraud suggestions.54 Similarly, Credit Managers con-
tained several references to Baird and Jackson's LBO article55 which 
dismissed summarily any suggestion that application of intentional 
fraudulent conveyance law would advance the inquiry. I endeavor, in 
the next sections of this Article, to follow the road less traveled. 56 
B. Overview of Apposite Generic Fraud Principles 
By generic fraud I mean no more than the common law of mis-
representation and deceit. 57 For example, Koch represents to Cuomo 
that he, Koch, has marketable title to the Brooklyn Bridge and in-
duces Cuomo to purchase the Bridge for the reasonable sum of 
$500,000. After the transaction, Cuomo discovers that he has been 
taken and brings a misrepresentation action against Koch because 
Koch did not in fact have marketable title to the Bridge and took 
advantage of Cuomo. In such a case, a misrepresentation action 
would probably exist, subject to Koch's defense based on plaintiff's 
inability to show reasonable reliance. Elements of the fraud or mis-
representation action have been formulated in various terms. Essen-
tially, the action requires that plaintiff show defendant made a false 
representation of a material fact, which defendant knew to be false 
when made, upon which plaintiff reasonably relied, and as a result of 
which plaintiff suffered damages. 58 
Cases construing and applying those elements in commercial and 
non-commercial settings are myriad and, predictably, have nothing to 
do with upstream guaranties of leveraged business acquisitions. If a 
54 See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip.), 578 
F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 
1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983); Lawless v. Eastern Milk Producers (In re Stop-N-
Go, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); TeleFest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 
1368, 1373, 1380 (D.N.J. 1984) (citing Rosenberg and Coquillette). ld. at 1373, 1380. 
55 See Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. at 177, 179-80, 182. 
56 See R. Frost, The Road Not Taken, stanza 4, lines 19-20. 
57 The elements of fraud, however, are pro~ided by statute in some states. See, e.g., Ala. 
Code§§ 6-5-100 to -104 (1975); Cal. Civ. Code§§ 1571-1574 (West 1982); Ga. Code Ann. 
§§ 51-6-1 to -4 (1981); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 9-03-07 to -10 (1975); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 
§ 20-10-2 (1987). 
ss The number of elements constituting fraud varies. See, e.g., Heyl v. Heyl, 445 So. 2d 88 
(La. Ct. App.) (two), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d 1228 (La. 1984); Bowman v. McElrath Poultry 
Co., 468 So. 2d 879 (Ala. 1985) (four); Gitschel v. Sauer, 212 Neb. 454, 323 N.W.2d 93 (1982) 
(six); Wagner v. Casteel, 136 Ariz. 29, 663 P.2d 1020 (1983) (nine). The number of elements 
is more often a matter of how the elements are separated and counted than a matter of 
substance. 
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guaranty or LBO plaintiff can convince a court to apply UFf A sec-
tion 4(a)(l)-proscribing transfers made or obligations incurred by a 
debtor "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of 
the debtor"59-a misrepresentation action could be stated. If generic 
fraud law is not the source of the "defraud" alternative, and a worth-
while measure of its impact, I have trouble seeing what else could 
determine the term's proper construction. 
The problems presented by engrafting the essential elements of 
fraud wholesale onto the intentional fraudulent transfer law may be 
overcome by analyzing application of fraud principles in stages. First, 
in the Brooklyn Bridge example, the similarity between the bridge's 
seller and the secured lender in the guaranty and LBO contexts must 
be established. Vis-a-vis the junior unsecured creditors of the guaran-
tor or acquired corporation, the lender's action often profoundly un-
dermines their interests. Before the transaction the unsecured 
creditors were doing business with a solvent entity.60 After the trans-
action it is unclear whether the debtor can fulfill its obligations to 
unsecured creditors. The corporation's liabilities have been increased 
without the addition of a counterbalancing asset. Even the Credit 
Managers court, in the LBO context, acknowledged as much.61 
Second, generic fraud generally requires a misrepresentation or 
its equivalent. In the guaranty and LBO cases it is difficult to see 
what might be construed as a misrepresentation, or even a representa-
tion at all. But several recent fraud cases have confronted this very 
problem-a situation in which one party seems to have taken advan-
tage of another without uttering a word. For instance, in Johnson v. 
Smith, 62 a not atypical fraud case, a buyer of real property took ad-
vantage of the seller by including a bilateral death provision in the 
note which the seller would accept in payment for the property. The 
clause provided that upon the purchaser's death the property would 
revert to the seller, and upon the seller's death the debt evidenced by 
the note would automatically extinguish. When the note was exe-
cuted, the buyer was twenty-five and the seller was seventy-five years 
old. The court determined that inserting the death clause in the note 
was fraudulent: "Misrepresentation . . . is not the only method 
through which fraud is practiced. To the contrary, fraud may be ac-
ted as well as spoken. " 63 
59 U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(l), 7A U.L.A. 652 (emphasis added). 
60 Or, at least more likely solvent. 
61 Credit Managers, 629 F. Supp. at 186. 
62 697 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
63 ld. at 632. 
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The misrepresentation element may be satisfied without a repre-
sentation at all in failure-to-disclose cases because silence may be ac-
tionable. That result is arguably inconsistent with the common law, 
and therefore is strictly circumscribed. 64 The elements of fraudulent 
concealment have been recited in the cases: concealment of material 
fact which should be disclosed; defendant's knowledge of the conceal-
ment; plaintiff's ignorance of fact concealed; defendant's intention 
that the concealment be acted upon by plaintiff; damage to plaintiff.65 
Before courts will impose a duty to disclose, they often need to find 
some special relationship between the party who should have dis-
closed a fact and the nondisclosure's victim. This should not be con-
fused with the constructive fraud cases, considered below,66 in which 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship must be shown. While a fidu-
ciary relationship would satisfy the relationship requisite in failure-to-
disclose cases, 67 a less intimate relation will often suffice. In determin-
ing whether a given relationship gives rise to the duty to disclose, the 
courts look to the nature of the information not disclosed. In Coface 
v. Optique Du Monde, Ltd., 68 for example, a guarantor failed to dis-
close to the creditor that the principal obligor was insolvent and 
would be unable to discharge its obligation. The court, relying on 
New York precedent69 and a Second Circuit opinion in accord with 
that precedent,70 refused to find a debtor-creditor relationship suffi-
cient to trigger the duty to disclose. 71 
As a surrogate for any type of confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship, some courts take a more direct approach to redress the bargain-
ing imbalance which is the substance of failure-to-disclose cases. 
· One's "superior knowledge" sometimes imposes a duty to disclose. In 
SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 72 a federal district court in Illinois 
64 See Moldofsky v. Stregack, 449 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (mere fact of 
non-disclosure ordinarily does not constitute actionable fraud). 
65 See Kopeikin v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 679 P.2d 599, 601 (Colo. 1984); 
Ackmann v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 645 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1982); Morrison v. Good-
speed, 100 Colo. 470, 68 P.2d 458 (1937). 
66 See infra notes 85-96. 
67 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (pretransaction duty to disclose 
arises from fiduciary duty); Thompson v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 539 F. Supp. 
859 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (duty to speak arises from trust and confidence inherent in fiduciary 
relationship), aff'd, 709 F.2d 1413 (11th Cir. 1983); Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 
358 N.E.2d 994 (1976) (silence cannot constitute fraudulent concealment absent fiduciary 
relationship). 
68 521 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
69 See Amend v. Hurley, 293 N.Y. 587, 59 N.E.2d 416 (1944). 
70 See Archawski v. Hanioti, 239 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984 
(1957). 
7 1 Coface, 521 F. Supp. at 504. 
72 99 F.R.D. 101 (N.D. III. 1983). 
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applied Illinois law to what was essentially a breach of contract ac-
tion,73 recognizing that "[a]ny prediction of future events (or state-
ment of intention) or opinion may be deemed fraudulent if the person 
making the representation has or professes to have superior knowl-
edge. "74 The SFM defendant was a manufacturer of non-conforming 
equipment which caused loss to the plaintiff-buyer. Certainly the 
manufacturer would be in a better position than its customers to 
know the capabilities of the machinery it sells. The "superior knowl-
edge" approach has been used by other courts. 75 
As an intermediate position between the failure-to-disclose and 
the constructive fraud cases, some states have fashioned a form of 
strict liability for the consequences flowing from entirely innocent 
misrepresentation. Some states provide for such liability by statute. 76 
Authority in other jurisdictions suggest that in some circumstances 
plaintiff need not even show that defendant should have appreciated 
the inaccuracy of a misrepresentation which caused plaintiff damage. 
Susser Petroleum Co. v. Latina Oil Corp. 77 relied on section 552 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 78 and construed that section, perhaps 
somewhat creatively, to provide strict liability: 
This section imposes liability upon a party that supplies false infor-
mation in the course of business for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions and it is immaterial whether or not such mis-
representation was made innocently or deliberately or with a 
fraudulent or dishonest intent .... To be actionable, the represen-
tation need only be false either by accident or intent. 79 
It is difficult to see how an innocent misrepresentation is the same as 
negligent misrepresentation. To hold an innocent defendant liable is a 
form of strict, if not absolute, liability. And plaintiff's counsel in 
73 Sometimes the line between breach of contract and fraud is hard to distinguish factually. 
Indeed, whether the case is tried and decided as one or the other often depends on which 
theory the plaintiff pursues. 
74 99 F.R.D. at 105. Accord Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Nat'l 
Ass'n, 731 F.2d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 
524 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 1975). 
75 See, e.g., Aaron Ferer & Sons, 731 F.2d at 123 (duty to disclose arises where one party 
possesses superior knowledge not available to the other); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milburn, 
615 F.2d 892, 895 (lOth Cir. 1980) (defendant's superior knowledge constitutes exception to 
general rule that misrepresentation of law is not actionable as fraud); Magnaleasing, Inc. v. 
Staten Island Mall, 428 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (S.D.N.Y.) (where one party has superior knowl-
edge, expression of opinion may form basis for actionable fraud), aff'd, 563 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
76 See Ala. Code § 6-5·104(b)(3) (1975); Cal. Civ. Code§ 1573 (West 1982). 
77 574 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). 
78 ld. at 832. 
79 Id. 
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states which equate innocent with negligent misrepresentation will 
likely pick up on the advantage such a formulation provides the party 
bearing the burden of proof. In Susser Petroleum, plaintiff alleged 
that defendant had misrepresented the availability of certain aviation 
fuel, and plaintiff relied on defendant's representations that the fuel 
would become available when in fact it did not. The court was not 
persuaded by defendant's contention that plaintiff's failure to prove 
negligence compromised plaintiff's maintenance of the misrepresenta-
tion action. Because the supplier-defendant was in a position to know 
plaintiff's needs and, by the nature of defendant's business, impliedly 
engaged to make only responsible and accurate representations re-
garding the particular matters in issue, defendant could not deny 
plaintiff's right to rely on the representation; the defendant's inno-
cence or bona fides were simply not proper matters for the court's 
consideration. 80 
A bankruptcy case applying Virginia law recited the state's com-
mon law rule that innocent misrepresentation is actionable. 81 The 
court cited a 1957 Virginia Supreme Court decision recognizing that 
"[ w ]hether the representation is made innocently or knowingly, if ac-
ted on, the effect is the same. " 82 In Virginia, at least according to its 
Supreme Court in 1957, innocent misrepresentation is a special form 
of constructive fraud. Though imposing liability for innocent misrep-
resentation has been described by venerable authority as a minority 
position, 83 the scope of constructive fraud is broad enough to include 
liability for innocent misrepresentation and the cause of action for 
constructive fraud is recognized in the vast majority of jurisdictions. 84 
Constructive fraud liability is premised on a breach of duty arising 
from a fiduciary or confidential relationship. It is sometimes referred 
to as "legal" or "moral" fraud; the law imputes liability to a relatively 
innocent party in order to vindicate an overriding public or even pri-
vate interest. The courts suggest defendant's moral guilt has nothing 
to do with constructive fraud. 85 
In practice, the decisions betray an uneasy tension between the 
80 Id. 
81 Community Hosp. v. Musser (111 re Musser), 24 Bankr. 913 (W.O. Va. 1982). 
82 ld. at 923 (citing B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312, 99 
S.E.2d 606 (1957)); Leeds v. Mundy, 212 Va. 475, 184 S.E.2d 751 (1971). 
83 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 25 (1943). 
84 E.g., Ala. Code§ 6-5-104(b)(3) (1975) (equating constructive fraud with negligent mis-
representation); Cal. Civ. Code§ 1573 (West 1982) (same). Most states, however, fix construc-
tive fraud liability by operation of common law instead of by statute. 
ss See Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. I 194, 456 S.W.2d 673 (1970); Coffey v. 
Wininger, 1561nd. App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154 (1973); Snell v. Cornehl, 81 N.M. 248,466 P.2d 
94 (1970). . 
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inclination to limit this form of essentially strict liability and the de-
sire to make whole a plaintiff who fell victim to her own ignorance 
when relying on the misrepresentations. Two considerations guide ju-
dicial application of constructive fraud principles: (1) limitations on 
the contexts in which liability arises-the nature of the relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant; and (2) limitations on plaintiff's use 
of constructive liability theory--offensively, to recover damages, or 
merely defensively, to avoid suffering a loss in reliance. 
Evidence that constructive fraud is not entirely distinct from neg-
ligent or innocent fraud is found in the cases discussing the nature of 
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant requisite to imposi-
tion of constructive fraud liability. There is not an established list of 
relationships which supply the necessary confidentiality or trust. 86 So 
long as the court finds that the victim reposed particular trust and 
confidence in the defendant-representor, the necessary relationship is 
established. 87 Such trust or confidence may be established by showing 
that defendant had greater expertise than plaintiff and that plaintiff 
relied on that expertise. There are references in the cases to one 
party's being "dominant" or "superior" in some way. 88 
In some cases the reviewing court has deemed a vendor-vendee 
relationship to impose a fiduciary duty on the defendant. 89 Other 
courts have refused to find the necessary relationship between a bank 
and borrower.90 Zeilenga v. Stelle Industries 91 recited the factors to 
be considered in determining the existence of a confidential relation-
ship between plaintiff and defendant: kinship, age difference, plain-
tiff's health and mental condition, and the extent to which plaintiff 
relied on defendant in the course of plaintiff's business and financial 
86 But see United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049, 1060 
(E.D.N.C. 1980) (suggesting that there are indeed "certain known and definite fiduciary rela-
tionships"), aff'd, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981). 
87 Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 
(1978). 
ss See Ebeling v. Burson (In re Estate of Heilman), 37 Ill. App. 3d 390, 345 N.E.2d 536 
(1976); Gross v. University of Chicago, 14 Ill. App. 3d 326, 302 N.E.2d 444 (1973); Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 77 Misc. 2d 962, 
357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 48 A.D.2d 428,370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975), aff'd, 
40 N.Y.2d 936, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57, 358 N.E.2d 882 (1976); In re Estate of McClatchy, 433 Pa. 
232, 249 A.2d 320 (1969). 
89 Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) (generally no fiduciary obligations between buyers and sellers of 
property). 
90 See Boatman v. Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank, 155 Ga. App. 848, 273 S.E.2d 190 (1980); 
Paskas v. Illini Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 109 Ill. App. 3d 24, 440 N.E.2d 194 (1982); Manson 
State Bank v. Tripp, 248 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1976). 
91 52 Ill. App. 3d 753, 367 N.E.2d 1347 (1977). 
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affairs. 92 While the analogy is by no means perfect, it is useful to 
compare the indicia of "control" catalogued in the UFT A definition 
of "insider. "93 
Once a court has determined that defendant's relationship with 
plaintiff gives rise to liability for constructive fraud, the issue remains 
what relief is appropriate. One possibility is that upon establishing 
the elements of constructive fraud, plaintiff shifts the burden of proof 
to defendant to show that there was no over-reaching or fraud.94 
Generally plaintiff may rescind the contract induced by defendant's 
misrepresentation.95 Another view is that the elements of construc-
tive fraud are parallel to those of breach of warranty and the same 
remedies apply.96 
Debate concerning the role of punitive damages in fraud cases 
also sheds light on the fundamental basis of fraud liability. Virtually 
all states award exemplary damages in intentional fraud cases, 
although the conditions prerequisite to such an award differ from 
92 Id. at 757, 367 N.E.2d at 1349-50. 
93 Section 1(7) of the UFTA states that "insider" includes: 
(i) if the debtor is an individual, 
(A) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; 
(B) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(C) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (B); or 
(D) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in 
control; 
(ii) if the debtor is a corporation, 
(A) a director of the debtor; 
(B) an officer of the debtor; 
(C) a person in control of the debtor; 
(D) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(E) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (D); or 
(F) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the 
debtor; 
(iii) if the debtor is a partnership, 
(A) a general partner in the debtor; 
(B) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in con-
trol of the debtor; 
(C) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(D) a general partner in a partnership described in Clause (C); or 
(E) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and 
(v) a managing agent of the debtor. 
U.F.T.A. § 1(7), 7A U.L.A. 644-45. 
94 Humphreys v. Latshaw (/11 re Latshaw's Estate), 194 Kan. 747, 751, 402 P.2d 323, 328 
(1965). 
<JS See Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971); Hertz 
Corp. v. Cox, 430 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1970); duPont v. Perot, 59 F.R.D. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 
Edward Greenband Enters. v. Pepper, 112 Ariz. 115, 538 P.2d 389 (1975). 
96 Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966). 
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state to state. 97 It is axiomatic that punitive damages are, by defini-
tion, intended to punish defendant, not to grant plaintiff a windfall.98 
Courts have not been consistent in their requirements for punitive 
awards. While some courts require no less than an absolute showing 
of fraud, others are satisfied with establishing defendants' heightened 
culpability. This inconsistency has created considerable confusion in 
at least one jurisdiction. 99 Given the nature of intentional fraud, it 
seems ludicrous to distinguish between "wanton and willful" and less 
sinister varieties. 
Fraud is nasty, and anyone who perpetrates it is arguably as fit 
for punishment as a common thief. Complications arise when less 
than intentional fraud is actionable because punitive damages should 
not flow from negligent, innocent, or mistaken misrepresentation. 
The problem is framing a precise definition of "intent" explicit 
enough to distinguish the levels of culpability delineated by different 
types of fraud. What constitutes intent is determined by the interpre-
tation chosen. One interpretation may require the intent to cause in-
jury to plaintiff; another view may focus instead on a defendant's 
intent to benefit at the plaintiff's expense. This tension is crucial 
when the issue is construction of the UFTA's intent-to-defraud provi-
sion. In generic fraud law the rule seems to be that only proof of 
wanton, willful, malicious, oppressive, or at least reckless behavior 
will support exemplary recovery.100 So long as plaintiff's counsel can 
convince the court or the trier of fact that defendant is vile, or de-
9 7 But see Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 27 Wash. App. 512, 521, 618 P.2d 1330, 
1336 (1980) {discussing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws§§ 148(1), 145(2)(a), 171, 
171 comments (b) and (d) (1971)), aff'd, 96 Wash. 2d 416,635 P.2d 708 (1981); ComputerSys. 
Eng'g, Inc. v. Qante1 Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 
1984). 
98 See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 11-12 
(5th ed. 1984): 
The policy of giving punitive damages has been a subject of much contro-
versy. They have been condemned as undue compensation beyond the plaintiff's 
just deserts, in the form of a criminal fine which should be paid to the state, if 
anyone, with the amount fixed only by the caprice of the jury and imposed without 
the usual safeguards thrown about criminal procedure, such as proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination, and even the rule 
against double jeopardy-since the defendant may still be prosecuted for the crime 
after being mulcted in the tort action. 
ld. (footnotes omitted). 
99 See Commentary, Punitive Damages and Fraud: Alabama's Deceptive Standard, 35 Ala. 
L. Rev. 101 (1984). 
100 See Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1286 (Alaska 1985) (where no 
evidence of malicious conduct in record, and record also foreclosed reckless indifference, air-
line not liable for punitive damages); Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 
1978); Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069 (Del. 1983). 
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fendant's behavior in the particular instance is vile, exemplary recov-
ery will be granted. 
Before drawing any conclusions concerning expanded applica-
tion of the intent-to-defraud provision in the uniform law of fraudu-
lent transfers, it is worthwhile to review a couple of other creditor 
liability theories suggested by commentators. Professor Clark sur-
veyed the normative bases of fraudulent conveyance law, equitable 
subordination doctrine, dividend restraint statutes, and piercing the 
corporate veil theories to formulate the proper influence of such 
mechanisms on redressing imbalances among creditors of a fiscally 
embarrassed debtor. 101 Few articles have been able to throw around 
concepts such as Truth, 102 Respect, 103 Evenhandedness, 104 and 
N onhindrance105 and still be taken seriously by the commercial com-
munity. Professor Clark suggested that courts were using equitable 
subordination and veil-piercing analysis to avoid the formal requisites 
of standard fraudulent conveyance analysis. 106 
More recently, Professor Schechter suggested that principles of 
agency and partnership could be utilized to aid unsecured creditors of 
101 Clark, supra note 7. 
1o2 Id. at 509 (Truth mandates that "in connection with transfers of property rights to 
others, a debtor is forbidden to tell lies to his creditors that will lead to the nonsatisfaction of 
their claims."). 
103 ld. at 510-ll. Clark "somewhat hesitantly" identifies respect as a normative ideal. Its 
command 
can be captured by a cliche: be just before you are generous. The debtor has a 
moral duty in transferring his property to give primacy to so-called legal obliga-
tions, which are usually the legitimate, conventional claims of standard contract 
and tort creditors, as opposed to the interests of self, family, friends, shareholders, 
and shrewder or more powerful bargaining parties. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
104 Id. at 512. ("Evenhandedness, in its fullest expression, has two aspects"-the debtor 
may not prefer one creditor over another when he is about to become insolvent and creditors 
should not seek such a preference.). 
I os I d. at 516. Truth, Respect, and Evenhandedness combine to form the ideal of 
Nonhindrance. 
106 Id. at 536. Clark writes: 
In summary, equitable subordination is not only a functional equivalent of 
conventional fraudulent conveyance law occasioned by procedural and administra-
tive factors, but also serves the purpose of expanding application of the ideals of 
Truth, Respect, and possibly Evenhandedness to situations which are not covered 
by technical fraudulent conveyance law because it is, perhaps arbitrarily, limited in 
its coverage to debtholder claimants against the debtor and to debtors who make 
or suffer transfers of benefits. 
Id. at 553. Clark also concludes that "the agency theory enunciated in piercing [the corporate 
veil] cases serves a practical function similar to that of equitable subordination doctrine, in that 
both avoid the perceived restraints of fraudulent conveyance law. Understandably, then, the 
piercing cases suppress mention of that body of law." ld. These conclusions were reached 
after thorough case analysis. 
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a debtor whose assets have been depleted at the insistence of a credi-
tor in position to exert control. 107 The rule he proposes is sweeping: 
When a creditor has exercised substantial control over its debtor's 
operations, and when that control has affected the payments made 
or costs incurred by the debtor and has also enabled the creditor to 
realize a potential benefit {whether or not actually received), then 
upon the debtor's insolvency the controlling creditor should be 
held liable for obligations of the debtor; such a creditor's liability 
extends to all obligations incurred, either (1) during the period of 
actual control or (2) before the exercise of control, but which re-
sulted in the actual receipt of benefits by the creditor.108 
Schechter's proposal would produce consequences in the upstream 
guaranty and LBO contexts beyond those contemplated by applica-
tion of generic fraud principles and intentional fraudulent transfer 
rules to attack certain guaranties and leveraged business acquisitions. 
However, it seems that the object of the generic fraud law is very 
much the same as the liability theories reviewed by Clark and 
Schechter. The generic fraud cases described in this section betray 
judicial impatience with actions of creditors in strong bargaining posi-
tions who take undue advantage of other commercial interests, 
whether of parties with whom the powerful creditors deal directly or 
other creditors with an interest in the welfare of such parties. While 
generic fraud law protects B from A's misrepresentation, some of the 
foregoing authorities suggest it is not a great analytical jump to per-
mit B's creditors to complain when A utilizes its superior bargaining 
position to prejudice those other creditors. That is precisely tlie situa-
tion in which unsecured creditors find themselves when a lender with 
significant bargaining power causes a debtor corporation to hypothe-
cate all of its assets to secure an upstream guaranty or financing for a 
leveraged business acquisition. 
C. A Comparison of Intentional and Constructive Fraud 
As discussed above, 109 most of the action in the guaranty and 
LBO contexts has involved the constructive fraud provisions of uni-
form fraudulent conveyance law. Courts110 and commentators111 
107 See Schechter, supra note 7. 
ws Id. at 881 (footnote omitted). 
IOIJ See Rosenberg, supra note 12; text accompanying supra notes 13, 16, and 22. 
110 See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goodman (/11 re Ollag Constr.), 578 F.2d 904 
(2d Cir. 1978); Consove v. Cohen (!11 re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982), 
aff'd, 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983); TeleFest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.J. 
1984); Lawless v. Eastern Milk Producers (In re Stop-N-Go, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 1983). 
111 See Rosenberg, supra note 12; Coquillette, supra note 19; Carlson, supra note 36. 
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have assumed that in the vast majority of commercial guaranty and 
LBO cases, only the constructive fraud provisions would come into 
play because, to paraphrase a commercial law giant, lunches at the 
bankers' club are not given to discussing how the customer might be 
hoisted a little higher upon his own petard. 1 12 Nor should we assume 
that lenders ponder means to prejudice the rights of their customers' 
creditors. But it is not all that clear why enterprising plaintiff's coun-
sel might not be willing to resort to the intent-to-defraud provision of 
the UFT A to attack a guaranty or LBO. Once the relationship be-
tween constructive fraudulent transfer law and intentional fraudulent 
transfer law is understood, it is no longer so clear that guaranties and 
LBOs should not be subject to avoidance as transactions intended to 
defraud the debtor/transferor's unsecured creditors. 
All fraudulent transfer law in this country is a product of the 
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which proscribed 
feigned, covinous and fraudulent Feoffments, Gifts, Grants, Alien-
ations, Conveyances, Bonds, Suits, Judgments and Executions, ... 
Which ... are devised and contrived of Malice, Fraud, Covin, Col-
lusion or Guile, to the End, Purpose and Intent, to delay, hinder or 
defraud Creditors and others of their just and lawful Actions, 
Suits, Debts, Accounts, Damages, Penalties, Forfeitures, Heriots, 
Mortuaries, and Reliefs .... ll3 
Certain indicia or badges of fraud developed only when courts became 
frustrated by the need to prove subjective intent in Statute of 13 Eliza-
beth cases. 114 However, those constructive badges of fraud only grew 
from the law's need to establish certain objective factors whose pres-
ence would imply the requisite fraudulent intent. The badges became 
presumptions of fraud in American courts 115 which eventually fo-
cused more on the transfer's prejudicial effect on the transferor's cred-
I 12 See Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.J. 
364, 376 (1952). 
I 13 13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1570). 
114 See Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601) (setting aside preferential 
conveyance of debtor' s farm and personal property). The Twyne's court catalogued six partic-
ularly significant factors: (I) the debtor made a general transfer of all property; (2) the debtor 
retained possession and use of the property; (3) the transfer was clandestine; (4) the transfer 
was made "pending the writ"; (5) the parties created a trust to govern use of the property; and 
(6) the deed explicitly vouched for its own validity and the parties' honesty and good faith. Id. 
at 812-14. 
I 1 s See S. Riesenfeld, Cases and Materials on Creditors' Remedies and Debtors' Protection 
371-72 (3d ed. 1979). See, e.g., Bean-Chamberlain Mfg. Co. v. Standard Spoke & Nipple Co., 
131 F. 2 I 5 (6th Cir. 1904) (invalidating debtor's conveyance of majority of corporation's assets 
to another corporation owned by debtor without inquiry into debtor's actual intent); Briggs v. 
Sanford, 219 Mass. 572, 107 N.E. 436 (1914) (common law under Statute of Elizabeth created 
presumption of fraud from conveyance by an insolvent for inadequate consideration). 
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itors than on the transferor's intent. Although the result was a purely 
constructive basis of liability, it was firmly grounded on the inten~ 
tional fraud principles of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws which drafted the UFCA in 1918116 was acutely aware of the 
relationship between intentional and constructive fraud liability. In 
order to make the decisions construing the badges of fraud more con-
sistent among jurisdictions, the UFCA drafters provided that proof of 
certain fact combinations would compel the conclusion that the trans~ 
fer should be avoided as fraudulent. 1 17 The original constructive 
fraud provisions, then, were designed to clarify inconsistencies among 
the states in their application of the badges of fraud, not to supplant 
application of intentional fraud law. The constructive indicia incor-
porated into the UFCA were adequacy of the consideration received 
by the transferor and solvency or insolvency of the transferor at or 
immediately after the transfer. 
The UFT A, following the model of the Bankruptcy Code, 118 con~ 
tinues those same indicia of fraud. 1 19 Even in the new Act there is no 
suggestion that constructive fraudulent transfer law should displace 
the operation of intentional fraud law. So, the argument here goes, 
once the plaintiff/unsecured creditor is able to establish generic fraud 
by utilizing the generic fraud construction of "intent," the guaranty 
or LBO which compromises the unsecured creditor's rights in the 
same way as misrepresentation or deceit would is subject to avoidance 
as a transfer consummated with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud. 
Even the UFTA's drafters, perhaps unwittingly, have recognized 
the symbiotic relationship between constructive and intentional fraud~ 
ulent transfer law posited here. 120 It is not enough to consider a 
transaction only from the constructive fraud perspective; the aspects 
116 Professor William Draper Lewis of the University of Pennsylvania drafted the UFCA at 
the request of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In 1919, 
the American Bar Association approved the Act. It was generally well received by the legal 
community. See Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, 27 Calif. L. Rev. l, 12 (1938) (the UFCA would add "clarity and breadth" to 
state Jaw); Note, Remedies of a Creditor for Setting Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance with 
Recommendations for Changes, 6 S.C.L.Q. 80,85 (1953) (UFCA is "highly desirable" because 
it provides a "positive course" for creditors to follow). 
117 See U.F.T.A., Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). 
I 18 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
119 The UFTA catalogs the indicia at§§ 4(a)(2), 4{b)(8), and 4(b)(9). Cf. U.F.C.A. §§ 3-4, 
7A U.L.A. 448-49, 474 (1985) (constructive fraud provisions include adequacy of considera-
tion and conveyances by insolvent). 
120 See U.F.T.A. § 4, comment 3, 7A U.L.A. 653-54 (1985); Alces & Dorr, supra note 9, at 
540-41. 
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of the transaction which suggest an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
must also be considered. That point seems to be obvious, but that 
guaranty and LBO commentaries focus on constructive rather than 
intentional fraud intimates a lack of sensitivity to the relationship be-
tween the two bases for avoiding some commercial transfers as fraud-
ulent. Once the relationship is obscured and transactors and their 
counsel focus only on the objective indicia of fraud-the constructive 
fraud provisions of the UFT A-important commercial interests may 
be compromised because the role of intentional fraud theories is 
ignored. 
Analysis has generally focused 121 on whether the transfer was for 
less than reasonably equivalent value122 and rendered the transferor 
insolvent or nearly insolvent. 123 Those considerations only matter 
when a court is deciding whether the transfer was constructively 
fraudulent. The focus disregards the interrelationship between con-
structive indicia and intent: constructive indicia are a surrogate for 
intent and their absence in a given situation does not mean that intent 
may not be shown. To suggest otherwise is to confuse the alternative 
bases of avoiding fraudulent transfers, and to deny unsecured credi-
tors in the guaranty and LBO contexts access to a viable theory. 
Moreover, the focus on constructive fraud necessarily emphasizes 
what I deem to be too often formal inquiries concerning the trans-
feror's solvency. Just as commercial bankruptcy law has limited the 
importance of insolvency, so should fraudulent transfer law.124 
Further, what constitutes reasonably equivalent value is unclear. 
Should the benefit realized by an acquired corporation through intro-
duction of new management constitute value reasonably equivalent to 
the value of the assets hypothecated to accommodate the transaction? 
It would seem to depend on one's perspective. Perhaps it would be 
appropriate to measure the value of that infusion of new talent by 
what it would demand in the marketplace. 125 But even that would be 
an impossible task in the LBO setting. 
Just because the shortcomings of constructive fraud analysis 
might be manifest does not necessarily mean that intentional-generic 
fraud analysis would be any better under the UFfA intent-to-defraud 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 12-56. 
t22 U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(2), 4{b)(8), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985). 
123 Id. § 4{b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985). 
124 See Alces & Dorr, supra note 9, at 542-43, 557-63. 
125 See Carlson, supra note 36, at 95 ("LBO produces new management with a credible 
chance to increase cash How, thereby further improving the position of the unsecured credi-
tors."). Baird & Jackson, supra note 37, at 853 ("With the buyout may come more stream-
lined and more effective management."). 
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provtston. In order to see how generic fraud principles could work in 
the UFf A to address the problems in the upstream guaranty and 
LBO settings, it is necessary to consider how the UFf A provisions 
might be adjusted to reach the most sensible results. The hypothetical 
bad man-counsel for the unsecured creditor-would want to use the 
intentional fraud provision to get unlimited relief. To avoid that re-
sult but at the same time to provide a useful framework for reviewing 
the impact of upstream guaranties and LBOs on unsecured creditors, 
it is worthwhile to consider how the UFT A might be adjusted to bal-
ance the implicated commercial interests. 
D. Application of UFTA Provisions to Upstream Guaranties and 
Leveraged Business Acquisitions 
Counsel for an unsecured creditor whose rights have been 
prejudiced by an upstream guaranty or LBO could urge a court to 
void the transaction as an intentional effort to defraud the unsecured 
creditor and those similarly situated. Such a "bad man" would argue 
that the effect of the guaranty or LBO was to remove from the un-
secured creditor's reach a considerable unencumbered asset pool and 
replace it with a subordinating all-assets security interest. The se-
cured creditor took advantage of its superior knowledge and control 
position to impair unsecured creditors' positions for the sake of im-
proving the secured creditor's own position and with no substantial 
benefit flowing to the debtor/transferor. Irrespective of the construc-
tive fraud tests concerning insolvency and transfer of reasonably 
equivalent value, the unsecured creditors have suffered. Crucial from 
the perspective of generic fraud law, the all-assets secured party as 
well as the debtor actually intended that the guaranty or LBO would 
result in secured creditors being protected at unsecured creditors' ex-
pense. In fact the debtor's business very likely could not have contin-
ued to function and feed the lien of the all-assets secured party but for 
the services and materials provided by unsecured creditors. 
In the upstream guaranty situation, the guarantor corporation's 
assets are encumbered in order to gain an extension of credit to the 
parent corporation. The guarantor receives no direct benefit from the 
transaction, though there is some argument that the guarantor must 
benefit from the transaction or it would not agree to execute the guar-
anty. 126 Even if true, such a conclusion ignores the perspective of un-
secured creditors prejudiced by the upstream guaranty: the corporate 
guarantor has given up something in which the unsecured creditors 
126 See Coquillette, supra note 19, at 435-38. 
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had an interest but has not given up anything of real value to the 
directors who executed the guaranty. The directors were not playing 
with their own money but with the unsecured creditors' money. If 
the guarantor corporation went insolvent before the guaranty was ex-
ecuted, the corporation's shareholders would stand behind the un-
secured creditors' claims; after the guaranty they stand behind the 
secured creditor. In either case they would receive little or nothing 
upon liquidation. But the share which the unsecured creditors would 
realize post-guaranty is significantly affected by the all-assets security 
interest of the lender who received the guaranty.127 
If a court would agree with the badman, unsecured creditor's 
counsel, that an upstream guaranty constitutes a transaction intended 
to defraud the unsecured creditors, what limits, if any should be im-
posed on the theory's operation? Certainly unsecured creditors whose 
. claims mature after the guaranty should not be heard to complain 
because they could have searched, and perhaps did search, UCC filing 
records to determine whether the guarantor/debtor's assets were en-
cumbered. If after finding the lender's security interest such a post-
guaranty unsecured creditor was concerned with the guarantor's fi-
nancial well-being, the unsecured creditor could have inquired further 
of the guarantor corporation. But the case is different for unsecured 
creditors with mature claims prejudiced by and at the guaranty trans-
action. Such creditors should be able to use the intentional fraudulent 
transfer theory to set aside the upstream guaranty because the debtor 
and secured party intended to destroy their valuable claim against the 
debtor in favor of the all-assets secured creditor. The transaction af-
forded the debtor no valuable-but at best a speculative--counterbal-
ancing benefit to which unsecured creditors could look in the event 
the guaranty were enforced by the secured party. 
The story is much the same for leveraged business acquisitions. 
127 You might wonder whether all article 9 all-assets secured transactions so prejudice un-
secured creditors' interests that they should be subject to fraudulent transfer attack. Of course 
the response to that speculation is that in a commercial finance transaction the debtor receives 
value on account of the grant of a security interest and the secured creditor can never recover 
more than that value should the creditor foreclose the security interest. But either an up-
stream guaranty or a subordinating all-assets se.curity interest may impair unsecured creditors' 
positions. Arguably, the UFfA's drafters were sensitive to the possibility. Section 4, com-
ment 3, focuses on the secured transaction from the perspective of the affected unsecured cred-
itors and suggests that such an arrangement may betray an intent to defraud. If the unsecured 
creditor can show that the all-assets security interest was granted to "hinder, delay or de-
fraud," the transfer will be avoidable as intentionally fraudulent. Doesn't an all-assets lender 
intend to protect its own position and often necessarily at the expense of unsecured creditors? 
Aggressive use of the intentional fraud provision might lead to an avoidance of a significant 
number of article 9 transactions. Courts should not get carried away from the perspective of 
20-20 hindsight. 
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While the acquired company may benefit from new management, it is 
hard for unsecured creditors, quite literally, to bank on that. There-
fore the existing unsecured creditors have, once again, been deprived 
of a benefit. Again, however, the problem is with limiting the scope of 
the intentional fraudulent transfer attack; only unsecured creditors 
with matured claims at the LBO should have standing to avoid the 
transaction. 128 
To accommodate and limit the offensive strategy available to un-
secured creditors seeking to avoid an upstream guaranty or LBO, the 
UFT A must be amended by a provision that would operate much like 
proximate causation in tort law. Rather than providing all creditors, 
both present and future, the right to avoid an upstream guaranty or 
LBO, section 4(a)(l) should be amended to provide that only credi-
tors with mature claims at the time of the guaranty or LBO have the 
right to set aside the transaction. 129 A new subsection 4(a)(l) would 
read: "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of 
the debtor to the extent that the loss suffered by such creditor was 
proximately caused by the transaction." Focusing on the causal rela-
tionship between the transaction prejudicing the unsecured creditor 
and the loss or impairment he suffers will insulate upstream guaran-
ties and LBOs from attack by post-transaction creditors. That con-
clusion is consistent with tort law because while liability for 
intentional wrongdoing may be sweeping, it does not entail liability 
for losses not caused by the malfeasance.130 
Alternatively, section 8 could be amended to provide a defense 
for the transferee whose acquisition of an interest in the debtor/trans-
feror's property did not cause a loss to the debtor's unsecured credi-
tors. If the creditors continued to extend unsecured credit to the 
debtor after the guaranty or LBO with knowledge or notice of the 
transaction their loss was caused by their own imprudence, not by the 
transferee's actions. Also to be insulated from liability is a transferee 
who provides notice of the guaranty or LBO to the debtor's creditors 
in a manner enabling the unsecured creditors to protect their posi-
128 This position is opposed to Schechter's suggestion. See supra text accompanying note 
108. Schechter would also allow unsecured creditors whose claims had not matured at the 
time of the LBO to avoid the transaction. 
129 It is not at all clear, however, that the provision would concern only upstream guaran-
ties and LBOs. Certainly all transactions which effect the same result-sacrificing the interests 
of trade-unsecured creditors in a manner providing them marketable value in exchange for 
subordination of their interests--should be proscribed by intentional fraudulent transfer law. 
130 W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts§ 41 (5th 
ed. 1984) (it is a fundamental proposition of tort law that an actor is not responsible for dam-
ages she did not cause). 
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tions. The Credit Managers Association 131 court expressly noted that 
the acquired corporation publicized the buyout to firms that did busi-
ness with it. The result in that case brought by post-LBO creditors is 
entirely consistent with the analysis suggested in this Article. Finally, 
consider the Third Circuit's recent decision in the latest round of the 
Gleneagles litigation, 132 invalidating mortgage interests as intention-
ally fraudulent because they lacked consideration and the transferor 
and transferee knew of the creditors' claims and that the creditors 
could not be paid. 133 Consideration to the debtor was lacking because 
a substantial portion of the loan proceeds were going to former share-
holders, the classic leveraged business acquisition. 134 The analysis 
suggested in this Article would clarify and vindicate that result in all 
upstream guaranty and LBO cases. 
CONCLUSION 
If nothing else, the argument suggested in this Article-likely to 
be made by the "bad man" counsel for unsecured creditors seeking to 
attack an upstream guaranty or LBO-is a bit myopic. It does not 
pursue a thorough policy analysis invoking the gods of 
microeconomic or even natural law theory to decide whether and 
when guaranties and LBO's should be avoidable as fraudulent trans-
actions. Instead, I started with the premise that plaintiff's counsel 
should be expected to assert all available plausible arguments; then I 
went about describing the basis of a plausible argument from generic 
fraud law. Finally I observed that the argument could go too far and 
I suggested a way to amend the UFTA to avoid unreasonable applica-
tion of generic fraud law. 
There is, of course, a downside to trying to anticipate the bad 
man's arguments: perhaps plaintiff's counsel would be given ideas 
they would not have developed on their own. One might also be ac-
cused of setting up straw men for the purpose of knocking them 
down. Nonetheless it seems preferable to anticipate and then respond 
rather than to sit back and await the worst. Had the UFCA drafters 
t31 629 F. Supp. 175, 180 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
132 United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 
107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987). 
I JJ Id. at 1304. 
I 34 We have decided that the district court reached the right conclusion here for the 
right reasons. It determined that liT did not act in good faith because it was 
aware, first, that the exchange would render Raymond insolvent, and second, that 
no member of the Raymond Group would receive fair consideration. We believe 
that this determination is consistent with the statute and case law. 
ld. at 1296. 
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anticipated the Durrett 135 scenario, commercial law could have been 
spared the uncertainty which prevailed until the UFfA resolved the 
issue. 136 
135 Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (invalidating foreclo-
sure sale under § 67d of the Bankruptcy Act as a fraudulent conveyance because property was 
sold for only 57.7% of its market value). 
I 36 The UFT A resolved the Durrett issue by declaring that all "regularly conducted" fore-
closure sales were unassailable. U.F.T.A. § 3, 7A U.L.A. 650. This may resolve little. See 
Alces & Dorr, supra note 9. Enterprising counsel for the plaintiff need only argue that the 
foreclosure sale was not "regularly conducted" and a "noncollusive" one, and the issue is 
again open to litigation. 
